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introduction 
The Report on ‘The Future of the WTO’ had a serious challenge to face. On the
one hand, it had to avoid Charybdis – the temptation of a cozy status quo, natural
in such a complex institution shaped by fifty years of ‘creative ambiguity’ and
customary practices that evolved into quasi-rules. But it also had to avoid Scylla –
the temptation of a cheap idealism leading to simplistic and/or unrealistic pro-
posals for reform, of which there were so many doing the rounds in Geneva and
in some European capitals when the Consultative Board began its work. 
The end result is highly commendable. The Report addresses all the critical
issues – preferential trade agreements, sovereignty, policy space, Single Under-
taking, special and differential treatment, graduation, etc. – which are major
sources of controversy, both amongst WTO Members themselves, and between
individual Members and their ‘civil societies’. Moreover, it manages to give the
layman a very lively overview of the WTO’s functioning, as illustrated by the
frank look at the critics of globalization in Chapter I. Last but not least, it makes
it clear just how difficult it will be to make meaningful and acceptable reforms –
how ‘grands desseins’ are misplaced, if not counterproductive, and how reforms
which may, at first glance, seem rather modest can in fact go a long way. 
Having said all this, a commentary is useful only to the extent that it offers
variations on the Report’s analysis and conclusions. This note presents three
such variations. First, it focuses on ‘domestic’ sovereignty, rather than on
‘external’ sovereignty as the Report does. Second, it is more cautious on the
erosion of non-discrimination – not by complacency, but for efficiency’s sake.
Third, it is more forthcoming on the issue of the ‘Single Undertaking’.
Together, these variations provide a different perspective that helps to priori-
tize the Report’s many recommendations in three key domains – making
WTO improvements subservient to the improvement of domestic WTO-
related institutions in each Member, re-ordering the three tracks suggested by
the Report in terms of organizational changes (Summits, Ministerials and the
senior officials’ consultative body), and suggesting a new approach on special
and differential treatment. 
* Professor of Economics at Sciences Po, Paris and Director of the Groupe d’Economie Mondiale de
Sciences Po (GEM).
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i. sovereignty 
At a first glance, the future of the WTO seems an international issue. But this
leaves out a key point: from an economic as well as a political perspective,
international trade issues are a reflection of domestic issues. This proposition
is best illustrated by the intrinsic conflicts of economic interest between
exporting and import-competing activities in every country. For instance,
focusing on the opposition between European farmers and those from the rest
of the world in Geneva is only half of the story – and not the most interesting
one. The fate of the Doha negotiations will primarily depend on what hap-
pens in Brussels to the extent that, when European farmers block the Doha
negotiations on agriculture, they inevitably harm the interests of European
manufacturers and service providers who would gain from better access to
foreign markets, were farm liberalization to be implemented. Similarly, when
a developing country does not liberalize its trade regime, it favors its most
protected sectors, which can generally count on well-established and powerful
entrenched interests, to the detriment of others that could have flourished
under freer trade. In sum, any ambassador to the WTO negotiates on two
fronts – against his/her colleagues in Geneva, and against conflicting domestic
coalitions in his/her capital city – and the fights in the capital cities are gener-
ally harder and more decisive. 
Trade matters involve thus a ‘domestic’ dimension of sovereignty. They
test the ability of a government to take into account the most ‘global’ welfare
possible, to go beyond narrow vested interests and to favor long term – often
infant or even potential – interests. Domestic sovereignty is at least as import-
ant as external sovereignty – to a large extent, the former determines the
latter. 
The Report refers en passant to domestic sovereignty, but it does not use it
as a pivotal argument. Its chapter on sovereignty relies on a definition
expressed in an international, ‘external’ context (monopoly over the legiti-
mate use of force, border control, policy autonomy and non-intervention
between sovereign Members). This exclusivity of approach inevitably puts the
Report on the defensive because the WTO limits the external sovereignty of
its Members. The Report puts forward the best defense available in the cir-
cumstances. But from the point of view of a layman, just how convincing is it
to emphasize the balance between, on the one hand, some loss of policy space
and, on the other, the advantages of cooperation and the rule of law at the
multilateral level? 
In sharp contrast, emphasizing domestic sovereignty presents the WTO in
a very favorable light because the WTO actually increases the domestic sover-
eignty of its Members – a positive argument of considerable value in our
world which is less preoccupied with international conflicts than with good
domestic governance. For instance, when the WTO bans quantitative restric-
tions and makes clear its ‘preference’ for tariffs as an instrument of protection,
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it helps Members’ governments avoid decisions that would give money and
power to entrenched private interests, leading almost inevitably to the govern-
ments’ capture by these private interests. When it provides incentives to
adopt a uniform and moderate tariff schedule, it makes more difficult the life
of lobbies (a lobby willing to get a tariff which would be higher than the exist-
ing uniform rate has to fight all the other lobbies) and it contributes to the
public coffers of its Members, thereby enlarging their ‘policy space’ to include
subsidies on production and consumption of goods, services and factors of
production – all instruments much more efficient to achieve desirable goals in
the context of an economic development strategy. 
As a result, focusing on domestic sovereignty inverts the conventional wis-
dom on freer trade versus protectionism. Too often, a government is per-
ceived by laymen as a benevolent and impartial actor: when it actively
protects a sector, it is expressing some kind of ‘public’ interest; freer trade
(i.e. less protection) must therefore favor narrow ‘private’ interests. Most
studies on protection, however, show exactly the opposite: it is apparently
m i g h t y  g o v e r n m e n t s  t h a t  a r e  c a p t u r e d  b y  t i n y  b u t  v e r y  p o w e r f u l  i n t e r e s t
groups, to the detriment of the vast majority – and in particular, to the detri-
ment of the poorest people who are, by definition, politically powerless.
Today, there is no better illustration of this reality than the capture of farm
policy in the EC and US: we see two mammoth governments held hostage by
a relatively small number of very determined, large farmers. Who loses?
Small, disorganized and/or poor farmers in the EU and US and elsewhere
and, of course, almost all the consumers in the world. 
In sum, emphasizing domestic sovereignty allows to move away from the
image of a government that is limited in its use of (often inefficient) tariffs and
quantitative restrictions, to that of a sophisticated government anxious to
spell out in detail the precise objectives of the country and to choose the best
instruments for achieving them. And, it presents the WTO as a machine pro-
ducing a more enlightened choice of instruments for achieving a country’s
preferred goals. 
Such an approach has an essential consequence for the institutional design
of the world trading system. It highlights the crucial importance of domestic
institutions (public or private) capable of revealing the opposing domestic
interests at stake. Such institutions can serve both to better inform public
opinion on the issues at stake and the forces present, and to enhance the gov-
ernment’s capacity to make more independent decisions, as best illustrated by
the Productivity Commission in Australia, a country far from convinced of
the gains to be had from freer trade three decades ago. During these last three
decades, this institution has carefully weighted the pros and cons of the
alternative available policies for achieving a desirable goal. This culture of
‘evaluation’ has almost always led to the substantiated conclusion that trade
policy is, at best, a second-ranking option which generates too many costs
without even achieving the desired goal. 
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All this sheds new light on the Report’s recommendations in favor of a
‘stronger’ WTO Secretariat. First, recognizing that funding will probably
never be abundant for WTO-related matters leads to the conclusion that as
many resources as possible should be kept for favoring the emergence of the
above-mentioned domestic institutions within WTO Members. These institu-
tions constitute an integral part of the WTO system to the same extent as the
WTO Secretariat per se. A more analytical WTO Secretariat will never be able
to change the turn of negotiations if the governments of WTO Members are
too much captured by their domestic vested interests. It will very rarely have
the capacity of being sufficiently critical when monitoring the Members’ trade
policy. The WTO Secretariat will be much more efficient in these core busi-
nesses if Members’ governments are freer at home and criticized by their own
nationals – and that depends critically on analytical capacity within WTO
Members. The priority should therefore be on developing these domestic
institutions, which ultimately underpin domestic sovereignty. 
Second, funding scarcity suggests concentrating the reinforcement of the
WTO Secretariat’s capabilities on its core activities: supporting trade negotia-
tions and monitoring Members’ trade policy. Other trade-related topics can
be covered by better placed international institutions (such as the World Bank
or the OECD) or by independent initiatives. The Report pays little attention
to the latter (for instance, it recognizes explicitly their role only in the con-
cluding paragraph on the dispute settlement system, and without drawing les-
sons from it). These initiatives differ from the ‘civil society’ to the extent that
they have no strong advocacy role, but rather participate in the much-desired
culture of evaluating the WTO system and the related public (international
and domestic) policies. They are likely to offer a much more flexible, timely
and independent analyses than ad hoc special expert groups to be immersed in
the WTO machinery – in the very much Member-driven WTO, independ-
ence may often have a too high price. Improving the interactions between
these initiatives and the WTO Secretariat is thus essential, and there is a need
for additional recommendations in this respect. 
ii. erosion of non-discrimination 
The Report tackles the erosion of non-discrimination head on. This highest
priority shows great concern for the serious dangers that preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) represent for the WTO architecture and development.
The Report’s general thrust on this topic is very convincing, and it does not
require any debate. However, there is room to introduce some nuances,
which are useful in so far as they help prioritize several of the Report’s recom-
mendations. More precisely, if there is little doubt that PTAs are trouble-
makers, the key question is to assess where these troubles are the most ser-
ious, and, in this respect, the Report paints a picture of the current situation
that is somewhat darker than it need be. 
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First, the number of PTAs is an unreliable indicator of the amount of
trouble they cause, as best illustrated by the following examples. Among the
169 PTAs notified to the WTO and in force, roughly 30 have been required
to create a single European PTA, centered on the EC and a few other partici-
pants (the EFTA countries, Turkey, the Faroe Islands). That 30 treaties were
needed instead of one simply reflects the intrinsically duplicative nature of a
trade diplomacy based on bilateral agreements (for instance, the EC-Turkey
customs union requires Turkey to sign a PTA with every country signing a
PTA with the EC, and similarly with the EFTA countries). Another interest-
ing case is the ten PTAs involving Balkan countries (to become 28 in the near
future!). This situation is the consequence of the decision – echoing the
recent wars in the region – made by the countries of that region to sign bilat-
eral PTAs rather than a regional PTA. All these bilateral PTAs are very simi-
lar, they are between signatories with low (and often similar) MFN tariffs,
and the current signatories are examining the possibility of consolidating all
these PTAs into one single act. 
In all these cases, it is hard to say whether discrimination has increased or
decreased following the increased number of PTAs. Similar difficulties are
encountered when one looks at the number of trade partners under MFN sta-
tus. This number may be low, but it has increased during the last decade, if
only by including a big, and rapidly expanding, share of the world economy
and trade, namely China. 
Second, recent experience suggests that it seems difficult to successfully
negotiate PTAs between large trading partners. It is reassuring that there are
economic and political forces at work behind these difficulties, as illustrated
by the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur, or among the countries
covered by the FTAA. From the EU and US perspective, the vast efficiency
of Brazilian agriculture, both in sugar-type products (i.e. products with
powerful protectionist lobbies in the US and the EC) and in soybean-type
products (i.e. products with traditionally export-oriented, free trade-friendly
lobbies, at least in the US) makes the FTAA and the EC-Mercosur FTA
politically unattractive options in the US and the EU. Both PTAs would
require the opening of these EU-US farm markets, confronting EC-US
domestic farmers directly with their strongest world competitors (those from
Brazil) while, in exchange, EU-US exporting interests would only gain access
to Brazilian markets. In other words, adjustment costs for – and hence, polit-
ical opposition from – the EC and US farmers are the same, whether the US
or EC farm market opening be negotiated in preferential agreements or at the
WTO level. In sharp contrast, the benefits for US and EC exporters from
regional or multilateral liberalization are very different because Mercosur
markets, while they are large, are nevertheless much smaller than the world
markets that would be opened by a WTO deal. 
Problems from a Brazilian (Mercosur) perspective are quite different, but
equally serious. From an economic point of view, tariff-rate quotas which
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might be offered by the US or the EC as a compromise are likely to be a trap
for Mercosur exporters and governments. It is by no means sure that Mercosur
exporters will in fact be able to obtain the rents associated with such tariff-rate
quotas (it is much more likely that they will go to European importing or pro-
ducing firms). From a political perspective, it may be difficult for Brazil to
leave the coalition that it has done so much to create in the Doha negotiations
in exchange for limited tariff-rate quotas in PTAs: such a move could only
have a negative, and long-lasting, impact on Brazil’s reputation as a coalition
leader in the WTO. 
Finally, PTAs between large trading partners are triggering increasing hos-
tility amongst businessmen who might feel protected by some agreements,
but excluded by the others – prompting them to ultimately prefer the multi-
lateral approach. 
As a result, the most pressing and serious danger to focus on comes from
PTAs involving small signatories. If, in the short run, their costs are mostly
borne by the small partners, these PTAs have, in the long run, the capacity to
block the whole WTO machinery, with small countries belonging to these
various PTAs joining together to protect their small – sometimes practically
nonexistent – preferences by opposing any multilateral deal. 
The fact that small countries fearful of liberalization decide to liberalize
anyway, but in the context of blatantly ‘unequal’ PTAs, whereas large trading
powers tend to rely on non-discrimination amongst themselves, is a puzzling
development. How can one rationalize such a bizarre situation? How can one
explain the logic of the many small country Trade Ministers who, after having
made impassioned speeches against multilateral liberalization in the Cancun
Ministerial, made every effort to leave the negotiating room with an appoint-
ment in Brussels and/or Washington in order to negotiate a PTA with provi-
sions more severe than those tabled in Cancun? Many of these PTAs will take
as long to negotiate as the Doha Round (that PTAs are faster to negotiate
than WTO deals is largely a myth). Many others will impose reciprocity and
thereby consign special and differential treatment to the wastebasket of his-
tory, as best illustrated by the negotiations between the African-Caribbean-
Pacific countries and the EC. Finally, an increasing number of these PTAs
include provisions emblazoned with a friendly ‘WTO-Plus’ label (labor, pat-
ents, geographical indications, etc.) but which would be better described as
somewhat crude evidence of the hegemonic signatory’s throwing its weight
around. Needless to say, such provisions are anathemas in the WTO, and
would have triggered an outcry if they had been negotiated there. 
This awkward situation may largely reflect two factors which interact in a
negative way. On the one hand, Trade Ministers are not usually senior politi-
cians. Rarely having a good sense of domestic sovereignty, and even more
rarely supported by robust domestic analytical capacities, they tend to ‘bluff’
too much – asking for excessively deep concessions from their partners in
exchange for excessively limited concessions from their own side – in speeches
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that are mostly written before coming to the Ministerials. On the other hand,
the WTO pays a price for its public prominence. Trade Ministers apprehen-
sive of trade liberalization (the vast majority in the case of small developing
countries) because they will be blamed for the unavoidable adjustment costs
in the first years of the liberalization process do not want, or cannot afford, to
negotiate in the spotlight. In sum, PTAs offer the secretive atmosphere that
the GATT used to grant, but that the WTO does not provide any more, and
that most Trade Ministers desperately need to survive at home. 
If this view is correct, it suggests a criterion for examining the three recom-
mendations suggested by the Report for improving the WTO process. Firstly,
the Report proposes Ministerial Conferences on an annual basis. But what has
just been said does not augur well for that proposal. Such Ministerials will sim-
ply make more permanent the exposure of apprehensive Trade Ministers to
the glare of public opinion, and especially to aggressive NGOs. Failures at
such Ministerials are likely to become more frequent than successes (nowa-
days, failures and successes are almost balanced) and the whole system will
have severe difficulties coping with this negative development. In other words,
WTO Ministerials do not need to be more frequent. What they really need is
to be ‘monitored’ from above (the Summits) and from below (the senior offi-
cials’ body). 
Second, the Report suggests a WTO Summit of World Leaders every five
years. This recommendation is much in tune with the theme of domestic sov-
ereignty: heads of state or government should, out of all politicians, be the
most inclined to look at the broadest possible picture. Compared with Trade
Ministers, they have the luxury of controlling the all-important issue of timing
– when they can launch trade reforms in order to reap their benefits, when
they can bear the adjustment costs, etc. However, creating Summits specific
to the WTO forum may not be the best way to get the most out of this idea.
After all, many heads of state or government have shown their inability to
promote trade reforms in the past – trade is a ‘petty-knotty’ topic – and hold-
ing Summits only every five years (almost an eternity in most political careers)
is a too low a reward for attracting most of the heads of state or governments. 
Why not turn to the existing G7-G8 Summits, and extend them to the ten
or so largest economies when they address trade issues – in other words, an
annual ‘trade day’ of twenty or so heads of state and government? This for-
mula has many merits. It relies on an existing, well-oiled process which is run
on an annual basis (making annual Ministerials even less necessary). It
would include developing countries with a large number of poor people, and
hence a real political legitimacy vis-à-vis the poorest developing countries.
Most of these developing countries are successful, and their leaders have
experienced the net benefits of trade liberalization. They are eager to con-
tinue their liberalization process at the multilateral level, so they are well
placed to undercut PTAs by eroding preferences through multilateral liberal-
ization. Finally, these Summits could invite non-permanent heads of state
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and government in a strategic manner – focusing on the regions or on the
kind of issues which are expected to be the most sensitive on the trade front
for the year to come. 
The Summit layer will impose an institutional condition on the WTO. It
will require from future WTO Directors-General more than competence and
experience, the two qualities underlined by the Report. It will require a polit-
ical stature allowing the Director-General to participate in these Summits
with the ease and the confidence that can exist only if the Director-General
has himself or herself previously been a head of state or government. 
Finally, the Report suggests the creation of a senior officials’ consultative
body which could indeed be an effective way of monitoring the Ministerials
from below. As the Report provides an exhaustive analysis of the very robust
reasons for creating such a body, what is left for discussion is its composition.
The Report suggests that it should include officials from the ‘ministries of
trade and agriculture and, perhaps, economy’. This looks like a recipe for pro-
tection (why a representative from the ministry of agriculture, and not one
from the ministry of steel or from the ministry of culture?). Rather, it is essen-
tial to have senior officials from the offices of heads of state or government
and from economics ministries, in addition to trade ministries. This composi-
tion would be all the more critical because these senior officials will largely
work as ‘sherpas’ for the Summits and the Ministerials. 
iii. single undertaking 
There is no doubt that the Single Undertaking adopted at the end of the Uru-
guay Round has profoundly changed the nature and the scope of the WTO. It
is a quantum leap, with all the positive connotations that such a word may
have, and that the Report underlines. But it is also a leap that a vast majority
of WTO Members have had difficulties coping with. The Emperor has
clothes, but they are much too large. 
In these circumstances, the worst approach would be to stick rigidly to the
Single Undertaking concept. In fact, although the WTO Members have
signed ‘constitutional’ agreements (on services, on TRIPs, etc.) all these
agreements have built-in flexibilities which, if fully used, go a long way in the
direction of a ‘variable geometry’ in the WTO system. 
The question is whether more should be done. The Report seems to bend
in this direction in its Chapter VII on variable geometry. But, it adopts a more
cautious attitude when it evokes ‘special and differential treatment’ (S&D) –
the fact that developing countries have different rights and obligations than
developed countries – in its Chapter II on the erosion of non-discrimination.
(To be fair, Chapter II developments are more about the past and Chapter
VII is more about the future.) As S&D can be seen as variable geometry
applied to developing countries, what follows tries to outline a new S&D in
line with the Report’s developments on variable geometry. 
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S&D has always been a difficult issue in the multilateral trade regime.
Problems are even more acute in the current Doha Round because develop-
ing and developed countries alike face a situation largely unknown before.
When S&D was established forty years ago, developing countries constituted
a relatively homogeneous group of countries – so much so that it did not mat-
ter that being a developing country in the WTO was a self-selection process.
And the strongest glue uniting all the developing countries was a profound
reluctance to liberalize. Meanwhile industrial countries, although they were
only marginally concerned by competition from developing countries, granted
S&D with little consideration for development, and they did not hesitate to
exclude the few key sectors for developing countries – shoes, clothing or agri-
culture. No wonder then that S&D did not work in these conditions, as
underlined by the Report. 
Today, one third of the ‘developing countries’ in the WTO have a GDP per
capita higher than the poorest Member states of the European Union. That
makes it increasingly harder for industrial countries – and the poorest coun-
tries alike – to still consider them as developing countries. Even in countries
such as India or China, there are regions with a level of wealth and activity
comparable to what exists in industrial countries. Moreover, recent years have
shown that developing countries can rapidly enter sectors which, only a few
years ago, were seen as the exclusive territory of rich economies, such as a
broad range of services. Finally, all the success stories – from Korea to Singa-
pore to China to India – have very little to do with S&D. Rather, they reflect
better domestic governance and classic economic recipes for growth – a
sound macroeconomic policy, a progressive but firm pace towards freer trade,
and an ever wider set of improved domestic regulatory policies. 
Does that mean that the S&D days are over? No. But, it definitely requires
a much more subtle approach than the black-and-white picture to which too
many trade negotiators are still overly attached today. 
Focusing first on the poorest countries, most of them lack the key input for
growth: a critical level of good governance. As a result, they still need prefer-
ential access to rich markets – indeed, rich countries can still do a lot in this
respect, such as opening their farm and clothing markets. That does not mean
that the poorest countries should make no concessions. As shown by a recent
UNCTAD study, these countries will gain mostly from trade liberalization
amongst developing countries – a situation reflecting the substantial but still
largely incomplete move of many developing countries towards freer trade
over the last decade. The poorest countries should thus focus on cutting their
high tariffs and binding them – hence, a progressive but firm move towards a
uniform and moderate tariff, as recently done de facto (and largely unilater-
ally) by countries such as China or India. Ideally, S&D could be made less
costly and potentially more beneficial for the poorest countries if set up in an
environment superseding all the existing schemes (in order to avoid the costly
trade barriers, such as rules of origin, which fragment preferences) and based
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on three pillars: a joint group of donors; a joint group of beneficiaries (to be
defined by relatively objective criteria, hence to be graduated when the time is
ripe, according to well defined rules); and asymmetrical market access requir-
ing limited reciprocity from the poorest countries. 
Second, if developing countries want ‘policy space’ in order to implement
their development strategy, they have plenty of instruments at their disposal –
production and consumption subsidies or taxes on goods, services and factors
of production – which can better reach the desired objectives, and at a much
lower cost for the country, than trade barriers. Trade liberalization and
domestic instruments should be seen as complementary: without freer trade,
domestic instruments can easily be useless, or even harmful; without
domestic instruments, the benefits of trade liberalization can be negligible
(for instance, dismantling trade barriers will have a limited impact if domestic
firms are not well connected to domestic markets). In general, WTO rules do
not constrain domestic instruments. However, there are cases where WTO
rules are ambiguous – when domestic instruments are ‘too’ sector-specific,
when they distort trade flows ‘too much’, etc. And there are cases where
WTO rules on domestic instruments are so lax for rich countries that they
have generated a ‘reverse’ S&D, such as in the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture. One should therefore aim to eliminate such uncertainties and
reversals. 
Third, as underlined by the Report, the Uruguay Round has massively
expanded the WTO’s scope, with the Agreements on services, on standards,
on trade-related intellectual property rights, etc. This expansion has gener-
ated a lot of fears. However, WTO disciplines on such matters are often
greatly exaggerated. The Agreement on services is probably the most flexible
of all WTO agreements. The core of the WTO Agreements on standards is to
protect developed and developing countries alike against an abusive use of
standards. The TRIPS Agreement is the one going the farthest in terms of
‘harmonization’, but it only sets minimum standards and it includes ‘escape’
clauses. All these WTO Agreements are less constraining and more flexible
than the corresponding provisions introduced in the recently signed PTAs –
indeed, these WTO rules could help limit the costs of ‘unequal’ PTAs for
developing countries that are trapped in them. Having said this, the fact
remains that all these WTO agreements are intrinsically intensive in domestic
regulatory policies, and this feature opens a completely new chapter in S&D
for the following reason: if improving market access in goods (reducing tariffs
or quotas) improves domestic welfare and reduces regulatory costs, opening
markets in services improves domestic welfare but it may also increase regula-
tory costs. 
As a result, the emergence of regulatory policies in the multilateral trading
system tends to magnify the key handicap of many developing countries –
good domestic governance – and to amplify the differences among them.
Introducing an economically sound and politically acceptable S&D into this
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context will be no easy task. As a starting point, two broad principles are of
vital importance. First, attention should be on regulatory creativity – do not
ask developing countries to mimic rich countries’ regulations inherited from
decades of the rule of law. Second, the Doha negotiations should focus on a
well-defined cluster of services offering the largest net benefits from consum-
ers’ gains and regulatory costs (a promising starting point for such a cluster of
services could be trade facilitation). 
concluding remarks 
The Report may have been too humble in two ways. First, it took great pains
to look at the critics of globalization – that was necessary and very well done.
But, why not to have mentioned that, according to the available polls, there is
a strong support for freer trade (80 percent and above) in all the countries
surveyed, and that the fear of globalization refers to perceptions beyond the
realm of trade (capitalist ‘crises,’ ‘evil’ firms, ‘immigration’, cultural ‘uniform-
ity’, etc.)? In other words, these polls suggest that the burden of the proof is
on the ‘anti-globalizers’ more than on the supporters of freer trade – a fact
hidden by a too-generous use of the term of ‘civil society’ by the Report. 
Second, this Report did not explicitly raise the issue of its aftermath. It
should not remain an isolated endeavor. It calls for monitoring what will be
done (if anything), how it works in practice, etc. In sum, it should lay the
foundations of a culture of evaluation of the WTO system – its institutional
architecture and rules. The difficult question is: how to do it? Annual reports
are not the answer: there is a need for some distance between two reports in
order to get a good sense of the ongoing changes, and their impact. Reports
on a regular basis (every ‘x’ years) run the risk of not being in harmony with
the WTO’s needs (if ‘x’ is too big), or of becoming routine (if ‘x’ is too small).
On the other hand, it is not even sure that future WTO Directors-General
will be interested or willing to launch similar endeavors when they are really
needed. Independent initiatives may thus have to play a key role. If so, they
should keep an important feature of this Report – the involvement of previous
Directors- General who, by the mere nature of their function, are among the
very few to have a full view of all the aspects of the WTO life – from the
smoky negotiating rooms to the lonely role of international advocate of freer
trade. 
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